As we look over Civil War books with good maps – we find the Formation of “Double Line” was very common during the last half of the war.  The formation was formed by having half of the Brigade Regiments in line with the remaining Brigade Regiments deployed in the rear but with deployment distance – not stacked close up.  In the Firebell rules, we should have a 1″ to 2″ open space between the Brigade lines (100 -200 yards).   This space was important to give the rear regiments the space required to deploy as the Brigadier ordered, also if the front of the Brigade entered into a fire fight this space limited damage to the rear support regiments.

In 1861, the Brigade officers went to war with the tactics learned from the Mexican-American War, the Brigade forming all of its regiments in line for maximum fire power. 

The tactics and terrain defined it’s use – (as a Brigadier leading 2,400 men the Brigade in line would be 1/2 mile long, could you see the end of your own formation or beyond and the threat to your flanks?)

Example, Antietam, the Union Iron Brigade, Gen. Gibbon in command, advances south to the battlefield during early dawn.  The Brigade in March Column moves off the road, forming regimental columns of divisions (2 companies wide) with two regiments in front, with two trailing behind, two long lines made up a number of company lines.  This Brigade formation of Double Line putting the unit into a battlefield formation, but not fully deployed into line yet.

AS THEY APPROACHED THE NORTH WOODS WHICH WAS IN THE FIRE ZONE OF MEADE’S BRIGADE, THE BRIGADE DOUBLE LINE DEPLOYED, TWO REGIMENTS IN THE FRONT – COLUMNS MOVING INTO LINE, THE TRAILING TWO REGIMENTS MOVING INTO LINE BEHIND THE FRONT TWO REGIMENTS. THEY MOVED AT COMMON TIME INTO THE WOODS, MOVING THROUGH THE PA RESERVES OF MEADE (passage of lines) INTO THE OPEN FIELDS SOUTH OF THE NORTH WOODS.  NOW AT THE FRONT – TWO COMPANY’S WERE SENT FORWARD AS A SKIRMISH SCREEN, THE REGIMENTS WENT TO GROUND/HALTED, THE SECOND LINE ABOUT 100 YARDS BEHIND THE FRONT LINE.  THE SKIRMISH LINE AT THE FENCE FOR THE CORN FIELD, ABOUT 200-300 YARDS IN FRONT. THE BRIGADIER HAS HELD HIS REGIMENTS IN DOUBLE LINE DUE TO THE TERRAIN (visibility) AND FOR IMPROVED MOVEMENT.

WHEN THE IRON BRIGADE ADVANCED ON THE ATTACK-SKIRMISHERS FELL BACK INTO LINE, THE BACK TWO REAR REGIMENTS WHEELED TO THE RIGHT TO BRING THEM ON TO THE RIGHT FLANK OF THE FRONT TWO REGIMENTS, NOW IN FULL BRIGADE FIRING LINE.

THE BRIGADE ENTERED THE CORN FIELD AND HISTORY.

Howard’s Brigade is sent forward, advancing south of the crossroads, moving to flank the Rebel line on Henry House Hill, working to stop the rebel advance and turn the battle.    As Howard moved up the western slope, he left two regiments in line as support and advanced two regiments in line up Chinn Ridge to the crest – his Brigade formed “Double Line”.
This formation was not stacked with the ranks closed up, but with intervals between the front and rear lines to allow the support regiments to deploy (react) as needed.  Well, we know this turned out bad, unless your underwear is grey.   (Link for battlefield map)

first-manassas-july-21-1(2)

Why would Howard do this?  He was not certain of the situation, his flanks appeared to be in the air (no support).  The combination of the crest line and woods limited Howard’s battlefield awareness.  Howard’s attack was a cautious advance, giving him the flexible choice.  Once he could see the enemy and know their position, the Brigade would form a four regiment firing line to launch the attack.  In history, he would not have the time…

Hope these battle examples help in understanding the battlefield. 

Gen. Hooker had 20 Infantry Divisions, 20 Division commanders at Chancellorsville. 

In the III Corps with Sickles is Berry, (present in our Seven Pines game) he is in the woods and is in the rear but close to the action where a Division Gen. should be.  Barry is with one Brigade, has to cross a road to get to the rear of his next brigade, he is told by his staff to not expose himself.   He runs over and makes it, the other brigade is in command, things are good, he runs back at which time a rebel SHARPSHOOTER HITS HIM IN THE ROAD, HE DIES. 

Gen. Whipple in the III Corps with Sickles, late in battle, the men are digging in on the new line north of the crossroads, light skirmish fire, snipers are bothering the men, the Gen. is in the act of sending an order to get Berdan’s men to assist when a SNIPER in a tree hits him in the chest, he dies OF RIFLE FIRE.

Gen. Devens with the XI Corps with Howard, his Division is hit first by Jackson’s men, hot – chaos – bad.  Devens is up close for command and control in the heavy woods, he moves up to rally one of his brigades that is breaking, is HIT BY SMALL ARMS IN THE FOOT WITH THE FRONT LINES, wounded out of action.

Interesting info huh?  Note, remember this is not counting the Brigade Generals/Colonels on the firing line – they die.  By giving these examples in major battles known by many, it helps to see the result compared to Firebell.

In the post on the evolution of the Command system in Firebell, our focus was with the gamer/player leading as the General of a Division.   Our solution for the role of the General of the Corps was to provide help, yet to put a historical brake onto the game table.   Decisions will have to be made, the General of the Corps can not assist everyone, all the time, limits exist.

With the list of options that the “gamer” can make for decisions, the day will happen quickly and the debate can be heard “they could do more than one thing!”   True, very true.
This question could be answered before it is asked – lets ride along to see the action.
=================================================================
“The General of the Corps was surrounded by Aides, the quartermaster was reporting in on the status of the Artillery trains that had been slow on the march.   Messengers had arrived from the nearby Corps to deliver information on the coordination of their mutual flanks.   As the Divisional Generals lead their formations into position, a steady stream of riders could be seen reporting in on their situation as the battle developed, within this Chaos the Army’s General had sent a currier to secure a ‘full report’, there wasn’t enough time in the moment.
As the Corps leader conducted the discussions, he looked about, his eye was on the General of the 1st Division, he was the weakest within his command team and his deployment needed to be addressed.  The Brigade that had led the Corps into action was off to his flank with the officers desperate to rally the men that would be needed in the hour ahead.  On the other flank was the artillery reserve waiting to be ordered into position for fire support, they should already be moving into position.   His thoughts flashed back to the last action-their last battle, in a desperate moment he had left his Corps position to order one of his Brigades into a counter attack, it was risky but had saved the day.   His mind was racing….”

The shell of a enemy battery exploded nearby, it disrupted the HQ group discussion but for the Veteran General it was time for a decision, an order was yelled….

This is a collection of my emails on command written in Sept. 2011 –

Have thought about this issue quite a bit the last few weeks, these kind of questions sometimes find a hole where you never knew one existed.   High command during a battle, we often read of the high command moving to battle, the deployment issues, the angle of attack, yet then what?     Gettysburg AGAIN, sorry,  many good examples.

Day 2, Longstreet’s attack at 4:00 PM> three Division commands –

Hood Div. HQ, is following the attack across the fields, in the rear where he belonged but hit by long range Artillery most likely smith’s guns on Devil’s Den, this was early in the advance.  He was out of action for the battle; aides had to find Gen. Law who commanded the southern most Brigade and was moving towards Big Round Top with his AL boys.   By the time they find him, he now has to transition his brigade command to the senior officers within his Regiments, confusion during the advance.   While Texas Brigade, under Robertson is split, half moving to the west on line with the AL boys, half drifting to the northeast.  With Gen. Hood down what has happened is the two brigades are drifting into two different attack vectors.  Gen. Law orders two of his AL regiments to swing north to fill the gap formed within the Texas Brigade line.   BOTH BRIGADE FORMATIONS ARE NOW BROKEN UP.   Gen. Law moves to take command for Gen. Hood.   The AL boy’s move into the fight, two actions form one for the south ridge on Little Round top, the other in front of Devil’s Den.

So what happened here, with the lost of Hood, and the replacement by Law, both Division and Brigade experienced Command changes in the launch of the attack, the early attack became disjointed.   With the next wave of Benning and Andersons’ Brigades this was over come.   Also to note, the Brigade that attacks Little Round Top (really half Law AL and half Robertson TX brigades) was under the command of the senior AL regiment out of touch with Division command.

End Result, the Division Command was not the same; the Brigade Command was not the same. Not good period.

Looking north to the Peach Orchard, McLaws Division, reading history you don’t hear much of McLaws.   Where was he, what was he doing, did he have any effect?   Kershaw and his SC boys were in the front wave, you read of him sending aides to Semmes Brigade in his rear, working to coordinate the two brigades actions, but what about Div. McLaws, He is not visible!

Gen. Longstreet has a large shadow over McLaws, Gen. Lee was concerned so old Pete was very close by.   He ordered artillery placement during the deployment, he is the one that released the Brigades/advancing with the SC boys under Kershaw for a short distance, and it was old Pete that stopped the attack and recalled the last attack by Wofford.

Looking North to the open fields, Gen. Anderson’s Division under A.P. Hill with five Brigades would continue the Southern attack at 6:30/7:00 PM with his five Brigades.   During the hot attack in Plum Run valley to the break thru on Cemetery Ridge by Gen. Wright’s GA boys, aides would find Gen. Anderson and his staff resting on the ground back in the woods behind Seminary Ridge, THEY WERE NOT EVEN IN ACTION, NOT EVEN WATCHING FROM THE REAR, SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED.   In game terms all five Brigades went into the fight out of command control, interesting heh?  Additional failure of Divisional command, Divisional Artillery is not repositioned for support as the attack breaks through.

On the other side of the field, the Union command is working like a machine, so much for the general history Gen. Lee’s army-Good command, Northern army-Bad command.

Example, Gen. Hancock’s ride during this period, he/II Corps command/ is ordering Divisions, he is ordering Brigades, he is ordering Regiments, he is ordering Battery’s, and he is in constant movement on the front lines moving over a mile on Cemetery Ridge.

Problem I will continue to work on, what I don’t like in rules systems, making the Division Command an extra fill in for Brigade command, the spare tire to fill in as needed, not correct.

================

Additional thoughts this afternoon, standing with the Union Command July 2nd, 1863—

What is the command Radius of Corps?

What Decisions can a Corps HQ make?

Is the Decision Limit based on ability per turn, a piss poor Corps (1 action/order/decision/ per turn), a good Corps maybe 2??

Note 100% correct, thinking out this; going from memory, what does the game model; do we place the gamer in the same decision box?  Got to love, Multiple Choices, but limits on how many one can make, pick wise……..

III Corps Sickles MADE the decision to advance to the high ground at the Peach Orchard, Corps Command is required for a division to move or to be placed, Corps level….  Divisions were given direction, not 100% rule, but damn close.

III Corps HQ staff with both Division Leaders place the artillery battery’s, High level (Corps and Division HQ) decision by 1863 AOP. (Additional point, the battery would unlimber by a brigade/regiment for support, but the direct/decision for placement was made by upper Command)

III Corps Sickles made the decision to transfer a Brigade from Humphrey’s Division to Birney’s Division, Corps Level Decision.

(Note, done by regiment piece mill, but with Grand tactic system, based on the whole Brigade.)

III Corps Gen. Sickles effect to rally men early in action.

==========================================

V Corps Sykes

Sykes leads his Corps to the South to reinforce Sickles III Corps, ordered by Army command.

Sykes makes decisions on the ground how to deploy his Divisions, breaks up some to send separate Brigades to Little Round top.

Sykes is not in Heavy action, but in the rear guiding troops to where they are needed, which was his job.

Key, Corps Command is placing units giving the Direction of movement.  Command points/value are spent in making another decision as each unit arrives in March column – this is good.

Late in action, Wheatfield, Sykes?Staff? Gave ok for the Brigades in Trostle Woods to reenter the Wheatfield to support Caldwell when his division was pressed.    V Corps/Division HQ, (Barnes? not sure) was there within radius, key point…

==========================================

II Corps Hancock

Hancock had moved one of his Divisions South about 500 yards at 1:00PM – about 4:00 or 4:30PM he is ordered by Army command to move a Division south to support the flank.  Army/Corps HQ decision.   The Division under Caldwell was in reserve had moved south by the flank, the regiments were stacked by brigades.   Interesting Point from John Simmons, this Division moved on the reverse slope, we shit history for Wellington and the reverse slope, yet at Gettysburg, little noticed.  Gibbon had Webb’s Brigade in reverse slope as well.  I think Willard/Hays Division moved done the reverse July 2.  The east side of Cemetery Hill is a broad slope, good ground to move men on, not as steep as the west side, wider as well.  II Corps Hancock is not with Caldwell at the South end of the ridge; Caldwell takes his division into action as ordered before.  Hancock-Decision- had set the direction and the movement.  This was Hancock’s old Division, a good one….

III Corps Divisions

Birney was stretched out – units out of reach. Command issues, Radius?? Coordination became impossible.

Took command of Brigade sent by Sickles to fill the line, -Division Decision

Birney worked to hold the line/Rally the men, Division Decision, later failed to rally what was left.

Humphreys’ on Emittsbury Road, only two Brigades, fought hard, rally to hold the line, controlled the artillery Battery’s – Division HQ decisions.  Late day, organized chaos in retreat, did rally the 2 small brigades at the ridge and was able to assist in the late day counter attack.  One Brigade had about 150 men, the other maybe 300, very small.

————————————————-

I strongly believe you need to have leadership within the system, as to optional rules, make the leadership rules standard and add the option for all leaders to be rated the same, maybe Able and Tolerated for new players learning the system or for a head’s up more competition type game.

The Civil War attraction is the cast of characters found in the pages of our history.

The values of two sets, Management and Morale – I support this, very good.

One is the combination of administration, could be Tactical skill of leading and Multi-Task management.  Give’s you terms to think as to how to describe this.

Morale separate, like this, there are guys that were good at tactical but the men would not fight well for them, it can cut both ways.

Good stuff, as to the ranges, have to playtest to tune this function.  From our talks you see the avg. gamer handling a Division, 4 to 5 brigades.   I think with experience this could be a Corps and it would work.

============================================

Working on the Shiloh OOB tonight, thinking on this very thought, I really like this leadership.

For the South you have old reliable Gen. Hardee,  “Efficient and Respected”

But of Course you also find Braxton Bragg, a “Hapless but Tolerated” General!

Sounds good.  I used the same tables for the Corps and Army as well, I think it will work; to have a different table would be very confusing to the gamers.  At Shiloh we have Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston a “Able and Respected” army commander, assisted by the hero of Bull Run, P.G.T. Beauregard, a very “Efficient and Respected” General!!

Lots of really bad leaders in the spring of 1862, wow.

P.S., I also have been writing down the Brigade Leading value for Division Generals, to put on the OOB in case they grab the colors and try to lead the men into battle if things start to go really bad.

I.E.  Old Hardee, the man that wrote the book, (Hardee’s Light Infantry Tactics) is a (4) – a better then avg. fighter; some of the Brigade leaders are not on the list, now going to the books to read up on their actions.

Union Example, the author Gen. Lew Wallace, between Ben Hur chapters he is seen as “Able”, but if leading the fight, a (2), He was heard to say, “I’m a writer, not a fighter!”   But of course not all is lost, old Crazy Sherman is very “Efficient”, and a real fighter (5) when pushed around.

=========================================================================
Corps is a difficult thing, if the player is a Division leader, to model command above the player, you cann’t build alot of restrictions or you leave the game world for the simulation, no fun for most.
Current thought is to have the Corps help the Division command, identify the positives that a Corps leader could assist a Division command, but not to build in the restrictions, I don’t believe you want that.  (-command points,  -chits  I Don’t think you want to go here..)
I’m thinking and working on this,  Corps would launch the advance and the attack, these functions would be built within the scenario for attack or when a Corps arrives onto the field of battle, agreed?  The Corps is managing his Divisions, working to see they are doing what he thinks, (we are letting the gamer do the thinking).
But, also the Corps General is giving orders – ADVICE – I had written before on this, so repeation what do you think of a Corps commander able to assist a Division General, this is the personal touch.   Note my Gettysburg article on Division McLaws and Gen. Longstreet as Corps is glued to his ass…  In game terms, maybe this moves the Division radius up on grade, the Corps General and his staff are on TOP of the Division to make sure they do ….
In game terms, three Divisions in battle, all calling for the Corps Generals attention, come help me???
Also, Corps could place Artillery Batteries that are needed for support, the placement might be outside the Division General support, maybe the Division is advancing, the Corps General is to the rear and guiding the support Artillery placement as they come into action.
Here again, players/gamers would see the role.  Lastly, a brigade in trouble, running to the rear, the Division General is still up front supporting his remaining brigades, the unit has routed outside of the Division radius; the Corps General moves over to step in the middle and rally the boys to reform the line!!

The Guns at Gettysburg –  This information was used for A Firebell in the Night discussion –

Deployment-engagement distances found during the three day battle –

Gettysburg presented a very open field for a Civil War battle –

Day 1

Herr Ridge to McPherson’s farm 1,300 yards

Seminary Ridge to West McPherson’s ridge/Perrin Brigade 600 yards

Seminary Ridge to East McPherson’s ridge/Scales Brigade 300 yards

East side of Oak Hill/Rode’s guns to Union/Dilger’s Position 1,230 yards

NE York Ave/Early’s guns to Barlow’s Knoll 1,000 yards

Day 2

Culp’s Hill to Brenners Hill 1,000 yards

East Cemetery Hill to Brenner’s Hill 1,500 yards

East Cemetery Hill to Brenner’s Hill the north end 2,000 yards, Position of 20# Parrotts

Hood’s Position on Warfield Ridge to Smith’s Guns on Devil’s Den 1,333 yards

Warfield Ridge to Little Round Top 1,667 yards

Wheatfield Road line to Rose Farm 500 yards

Seminary Ridge/McLaws to Peach Orchard 666 yards

Seminary Ridge/McLaws to Plum Run 1,500 yards

Trostle House/Bigelow Position to Peach Orchard 666 yards

Smith’s section Valley of Death to the Slaughter Pen 1,500 yards

Seminary ridge to Cemetery Ridge 1,333 yards

Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Hill 1,500 yards

Seminary Ridge, North, to Cemetery Hill 1,733 yards

Powers Hill to Spangler’s Spring 1,000 yards

Steven’s Knoll and East Cemetery Hill vs. Early 670 yards and less

Day 3

Rogers House/Emitsburg Road to II Corps 850 to 1,000 yards

Powers Hill to East Culp’s Hill 1,200 yards

Longstreet’s Guns on Emitsburg Rd to Union/McGilvery gun line 1,330 yards

Daniel’s/McGilvery line to the flank of Kempers line 666 yards

Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Ridge 1,333 yards

Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Hill 1,500 yards

Seminary Ridge/North end to Cemetery Hill 1,733 yards

Cemetery Ridge/II Corps Guns Canister opened at 350 yards

-without shot or shell had to wait for Canister Range, 3” rifles.